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The Supreme Court’s Confused Election Law
Jurisprudence: Should Competitiveness Matter?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Roberts Court handed down two election law decisions in its
first Term. The decisions did not create significant change in the
constitutional framework of election law. However, they did not leave a
stable status quo, as the decisions, to a degree, contradict each other. In
Randall v. Sorrell, six Justices struck down a Vermont campaign finance
law but disagreed why it was unconstitutional.1 In League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), five Justices declined to
sustain a partisan gerrymandering claim, but disagreed on whether such
claims could even state a valid cause of action.2 Each lead opinion
produced significant criticism from the concurring Justices, as well as
vigorous dissents. The varied positions of the Justices suggest that the
Court’s temporary position on election law is unstable.
The rationales of Randall and LULAC exhibit a contradiction
concerning electoral competitiveness. Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion
in Randall relied on the anticompetitive effects of the campaign finance
law at issue to strike it down.3 However, Justice Kennedy’s plurality
opinion in LULAC ignored the anticompetitive effects of gerrymandering
over the objections of the dissenters.4 It is difficult to see why electoral
competitiveness should be important to the Constitution in one context
but irrelevant in another, yet the Court’s holdings yield just that result.
Because electoral competitiveness involves important constitutional
considerations, the Supreme Court should treat it consistently.
This Comment will explore the tension between these two decisions
and the idea of electoral competitiveness as a factor in evaluating the
constitutionality of election laws. Part II presents a brief survey of the
degree and effects of electoral competitiveness in American politics. Part
III gives a background on Supreme Court election law jurisprudence.
Part IV examines Randall in depth, while Part V treats LULAC. Part VI

1.
2.
3.
4.

See 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
See 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2495.
See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2626.
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analyzes the positions espoused by the Justices on the current Court and
suggests possible directions that the Supreme Court could take to resolve
the discrepancies in its electoral jurisprudence.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF ELECTORAL COMPETITIVENESS
Despite the closeness of the last two presidential elections, American
elections are not generally competitive. Gerrymandering5 has greatly
reduced the degree of electoral competitiveness in the House of
Representatives, as well as in many state legislatures.6 For example,
American politics expert Michael Barone notes that the post-2000
Census redistricting cycle yielded “many bipartisan incumbent protection
plans that left few seats at risk for either party.”7 The 2002 elections
resulted in a House of Representatives in which only 39 out of 435
members had won with less than 55 percent of the vote.8 After 2004, this
dropped to 26 members.9 Only twenty-three House elections in 2004 had
a margin of less than 10 percent between the winning candidate and the
runner-up.10 While the 2006 elections were more competitive, election
5. “The practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly
irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting
strength.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 304 (2d pocket ed. 2005). Note that this definition of
gerrymandering is incomplete, because some gerrymandering plans are bipartisan in nature,
designed to protect all incumbents from competition, both those in the majority and those in the
minority. See infra text accompanying note 7.
6. Gerrymandering is not the only explanation for general incumbent success, as incumbents
enjoy several advantages in seeking reelection compared to their challengers. Incumbents tend to
have higher name recognition, greater access to campaign funds, and fewer and less serious primary
challengers, among other advantages. See, e.g., JOHN L. MOORE, Incumbency, in ELECTIONS A TO Z
226
(2003),
available
at
http://library.cqpress.com/
elections/document.php?id=elaz2d-156-7510-403308&type=hitlist&num=10&
(discussing
advantages of incumbency). However, incumbent advantage does not entirely explain the
noncompetitiveness of most elections for the House of Representatives.
7. MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2004,
at 44 (2003); see also David Lublin & Michael P. McDonald, Is It Time To Draw the Line?: The
Impact of Redistricting on Competition in State House Elections, 5 ELECTION L.J. 144, 144 n.3
(2006) (“The claim that redistricting has reduced competitive elections appears in editorial pages
across the political spectrum.”); Kenneth Jost, Redistricting Disputes: Should the Courts Limit
Partisan Gerrymandering?, 14 CQ RESEARCHER NO. 10 (March 12, 2004), available at
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2004031200
&type=query&num=redistricting+disputes& (“Republican-drawn maps in some key states helped
the GOP gain House seats in the 2002 midterm congressional elections, which saw significantly less
turnover than in similar elections during the last 30 years.”).
8. BARONE & COHEN, supra note 7, at 1786.
9. MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2006,
at 1863 (2005).
10. CQ’S POLITICS IN AMERICA 2006, at vii (Jackie Koszczuk & H. Amy Stern eds., 2005).
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years of revolutionary change are the exception rather than the norm in
American politics.11
The general lack of electoral competitiveness causes many problems.
That only 6 percent of the elections for the House of Representatives in
2004 were particularly competitive is troubling since the Founders
intended the House, with its frequent elections, to be the part of the
Federal Government closest to and most representative of the voters.
James Madison thought that the Constitution would ensure that the
House would “have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate
sympathy with, the people.”12 Particularly ironic is his statement that
“we cannot doubt that . . . biennial elections, under the federal system,
cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the House of
Representatives on their constituents.”13 Today most Representatives are
easily reelected if they want to stay in office. While the Constitution does
not explicitly mandate that elections to the House be competitive, it
seems likely that Madison would be surprised at how noncompetitive
House elections have become.
Furthermore, bipartisan gerrymanders designed to protect
incumbents arguably hurt the interests of the national political parties for
the benefit of the incumbent politicians. For instance, pundits
commenting before the 2006 elections noted that the Democrats, despite
facing a weaker Republican party than in previous elections, faced
difficulties recapturing a House majority because gerrymandering had
reduced the number of seats in play.14 Analysis after the election
suggests that Democrats captured fewer seats than they might otherwise
have been able to absent gerrymandering.15 A political party that
11. To illustrate, partisan control of the House of Representatives has only switched twice
since the mid-1950s: in 1994 and 2006. Over that same period, the Senate, less insulated from
swings in public opinion, switched in 1980, 1986, 1994, 2001, 2002, and 2006.
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 286 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
13. Id. at 287.
14. See Mickey Kaus, Re: Cake-baking, Kausfiles, Sept. 11, 2006, http://www.slate
.com/id/2149332/&#pelosihack (last visited Jan. 25, 2007) (sarcastically observing that “[a]t least
Nancy ‘I’m-going-to-become-Speaker’ Pelosi wasn’t such a shortsighted party hack that she raised
money to defeat the [anti-gerrymandering] measure that would have gotten her party a third of the
seats it needs [to regain control of the House]”); Larry J. Sabato, 2006 House, Sabato’s Crystal Ball,
http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/2006/house/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2007) (“Thanks largely
to redistricting in recent years, Democratic efforts to ‘expand the playing field’ of competitive House
races so as to make contestable the GOP’s relatively slim margin (within the broader historical
context) have gone down in flames.”).
15. See, e.g., RealClearPolitics Poll Averages, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/polls/
archive/?poll_id=14#data (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). The RCP poll averages from the run-up to the
election show that the Democrats had a 11.5% lead on Republicans in the generic House vote. Id.
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gerrymanders can protect some of its incumbents if the electorate turns
against it; the cost of such insurance is that it foregoes the opportunity to
gain more seats if the electorate turns against its opponents.
Lack of electoral competition causes other harms. Conventional
wisdom among political pundits is that competitive races increase voter
turnout, while noncompetitive races depress it. Political scientist André
Blais analyzed several studies testing this conventional wisdom:
[T]he verdict is crystal clear with respect to closeness: closeness has
been found to increase turnout in 27 of the 32 different studies that
have tested the relationship, in many different settings and with diverse
methodologies. There are strong reasons to believe that . . . more
people vote when the election is close.16

Empirical data shows that when elections are close, more people vote;
conversely, voters have less incentive to vote if they are gerrymandered
into districts in which their votes will not affect the outcome.
Noncompetitive general elections may also lead to increased
polarization of legislatures.17 Representatives who know that large
majorities of voters in their districts are unlikely to vote for candidates of
the other party are freer to discount views and positions of voters and
legislators of that party. Furthermore, such representatives are likely to
be more attentive to those voters who choose to vote in primary
elections; those who vote in primaries tend to be more partisan and less
moderate than voters in general elections.18 By focusing on the most
partisan voters, legislators are more likely to favor extreme positions and
to be less representative of the political center. Thus, a lack of electoral

This would translate into a 244-191 partisan split in the House if the election results perfectly
mirrored voter preferences. However, the actual partisan split in the House for the 110th Congress
appears (at this writing) to be 233-202. CNN.com Elections 2006: House of Representatives,
CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/ house/ (last visited January 25,
2007). Conceivably, Democrats could have gained more seats in close races if gerrymanders had
been replaced with more competitive plans.
16. ANDRÉ BLAIS, TO VOTE OR NOT TO VOTE 60 (2000).
17. See Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting, 2004
SUP. CT. REV. 409, 430 (“[B]ipartisan gerrymanders should predictably lead to greater polarization
in congressional delegations.”); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where To Draw the Line?:
Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 574 (2004); Adam Raviv,
Unsafe Harbors: One Person, One Vote and Partisan Redistricting, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001,
1068 (2005) (“The creation of so many safe seats contributes to the polarization of American
politics.”).
18. See Karen M. Kaufmann et al., A Promise Fulfilled? Open Primaries and Representation,
65 J. POL. 457, 465 (2003) (discussing research showing moderating influence of open primaries on
primary electorates).
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competition can lead to deadlocked legislatures in which extreme
positions are overrepresented at the expense of more moderate (and
perhaps representative) views.
Just as noncompetitive elections can harm the political process,
competitive elections can help it. Competitive elections matter because
political campaigns can have a positive influence on the electorate. For
example, vigorous campaigns can benefit democracy by increasing voter
knowledge.19 Candidates try to educate voters about their positions on
issues that voters will likely view favorably, as well as to inform voters
about their opponents’ positions on issues that voters will likely view
unfavorably. Thus, voters’ knowledge of candidates’ positions on issues
improves as candidates get their messages out. Candidates disseminate
messages in a variety of ways. Some ways are relatively costless—for
instance, discussing issue positions during interviews with interested
media outlets.20 However, effectively disseminating campaign messages
in a modern campaign for any congressional office also requires
spending money—sending messages through mailings, telephone calls,
radio or television advertisements, and even billboards.21 Generally, the
more money candidates spend, the more effectively they can disseminate
their preferred messages to the electorate. Some level of effective
campaign spending is an essential prerequisite for a challenger to run a
successful (or even competitive) campaign.22
Conversely, less money will be spent educating the electorate by
candidates challenging incumbents in noncompetitive districts. Donors
tend to give strategically to candidates who have a significant chance of
winning and to decline to fund candidates who are unlikely to win,
19. See John J. Coleman & Paul F. Manna, Congressional Campaign Spending and the
Quality of Democracy, 62 J. POL. 757, 783 (2000) (“Our findings suggest that a stronger, though not
unqualified, case can be made for the beneficial effects of spending. Overall, campaign spending
neither increases nor decreases political trust, efficacy, or interest in and attention to campaigns.
Spending does contribute to knowledge and affect. Accurate perceptions of the incumbent’s record
are generally improved by incumbent spending and reduced by challenger spending, in practice
typically producing a net result of more accuracy and more competitiveness that we believe benefits
democratic elections.”).
20. JOHN L. MOORE, Campaign, Basic Stages of, in ELECTIONS A TO Z, supra note 6 (“Ads
on television are the largest single expense in many campaigns, and candidates welcome free guest
spots on TV and radio news and talk shows.”).
21. See id.
22. See Alan Gerber, Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election
Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 401, 410 (1998) (“I find that
spending by both the challenger and the incumbent has large and statistically significant effects on
vote shares. . . . Campaign finance, and specifically the level of incumbent spending, is a potentially
critical factor in the competitiveness of congressional elections.”).
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making it difficult for long-shot candidates to raise much money.23 Thus,
voters in noncompetitive districts tend not to hear the messages of
challengers to the incumbent officeholder or incumbent party. Even
incumbents in safe districts have less incentive to educate the general
electorate, as such incumbents are unlikely to face significant opposition.
American elections are not as competitive as they could be. This lack
of competitiveness causes harms including less informed voters,
polarization of legislatures, decreased voter interest, and decline of
democratic accountability to popular will by elected representatives.
However, the Supreme Court has not systematically addressed these
harms, though it has chosen to address other election-related harms, as
discussed in the following Part.
III. SUPREME COURT ELECTION LAW PRECEDENTS
The Supreme Court began a major series of election law decisions in
the 1960s with its “one person, one vote”24 jurisprudence. It later
addressed electoral districting and campaign finance.
A. One Person, One Vote
The Supreme Court began intervening in the “political thicket”25 of
election law in the early 1960s. In a series of cases from 1962 to 1964,
the Warren Court invalidated malapportionment and instituted the one
person, one vote standard at both the federal (House) and state
(legislative) levels.26 This standard is easy for courts to administer, as
they must merely check to see if congressional and state legislative
districts contain equal populations.27
It is worth noting, however, that calling the constitutional rule the
“one person, one vote” standard is somewhat misleading. The standard
implies that each voter’s chance to affect an election is equal. However,
voters’ chances of influencing an election can vary widely. In practice,

23. See JOHN L. MOORE, Incumbency, in ELECTIONS A TO Z, supra note 6, at 226.
24. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381
(1963)).
25. Id. at 566.
26. See id. at 568 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (“[A]s nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be
worth as much as another’s.”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding that claims of
inequitable malapportionment of state legislatures state a federal cause of action).
27. See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Elections § 12 (2006).
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the standard means that representatives represent approximately equal
numbers of people, but that voters’ chances to influence an election are
not equal. Representatives do not even represent the same number of
voters, as districts contain varying percentages of persons ineligible to
vote due to age, statutory ineligibility, or noncitizenship.28 Thus, a
voter’s chances of affecting the outcome of an election are not
mathematically equal to those of voters in other districts, even before
competitiveness is taken into account.
The disparity between voters’ chances to affect elections is even
greater when competitiveness is taken into account. Ironically, while
fewer voters tend to vote in noncompetitive elections (meaning that each
voter’s vote is a larger fraction of the total votes cast), a voter’s chances
of affecting an election are greater in a higher-turnout, more competitive
election because such an election tends to be closer. For instance, in a
gerrymandered safe district in which sixty-five percent of voters identify
with the incumbent’s party, a voter of either party is unlikely to influence
the election. In such a situation, voters can (and do) vote, but they are
likely to realize that their votes did not influence the outcome, even if
they supported the incumbent. However, in a more competitive district,
such as one in which fifty-two percent of voters more closely identify
with the incumbent’s party and forty-eight percent of voters more closely
identify with the challenger’s party, a voter’s vote is much more likely to
influence the outcome. Supporters of a victorious incumbent are less
likely to assume that she takes their votes for granted, and even
supporters of a defeated challenger are more likely to think the
incumbent must take their views into account, as her margin of support is
slim enough that every vote will count in the next election.
The Supreme Court’s statement that “one man’s vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s”29 is not
fulfilled through its equal population standard because a voter in a
noncompetitive district has considerably less influence on the outcome of
the race than a voter in a competitive district.30 Electoral competitiveness
and other factors affect a voter’s ability to influence an election, so the

28. See, e.g., Reapportionment: The Number of Seats, in GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS (John L.
Moore, Jon P. Preimesberger & David R. Tarr eds., vol. 2, 2001), available at
http://library.cqpress.com/elections/gusel2-153-7238-393331 (noting that illegal aliens are included
in population totals for reapportionment purposes).
29. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 8.
30. See Nathanial Persily, Thad Kousser & Patrick Egan, The Complicated Impact of One
Person, One Vote on Political Competition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1299, 1313 (2002).
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Supreme Court’s one person, one vote standard does not completely
fulfill its stated goal.
The judiciary’s involvement in election law did not end with
ensuring that states followed the one person, one vote standard in their
electoral districting. The Voting Rights Act, first passed by Congress in
1965,31 produced a flood of litigation, including several high-profile
Supreme Court cases upholding and interpreting that statute.32
The Supreme Court did not directly attack partisan gerrymandering
as part of this burst of judicial activity on election law, deciding that
gerrymandering remained a political question outside the competence of
the courts.33 In the early 1970s, Justice White noted for the Court that
“we have not yet deemed it a denial of equal protection to deny
legislative seats to losing candidates, even in those so-called ‘safe’
districts where the same party wins year after year.”34 In another
majority opinion, he wrote that “[i]t would be idle, we think, to contend
that any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a
reapportionment plan is sufficient to invalidate it. Our cases indicate
quite the contrary.”35
B. Partisan Gerrymandering
The Supreme Court later retreated from Justice White’s sweeping
language that safe seats and political gerrymanders were nonjusticiable.
The Court implied that states violate the Constitution’s guarantee of
equal protection by gerrymandering voters into noncompetitive
districts,36 but then consistently failed to implement the rule in
practice.37
In 1986, while addressing the Republican-controlled Indiana
Legislature’s districting plan, the Court in Davis v. Bandemer held for
the first time that partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable.38
However, the Justices did not agree on a standard to manage such claims,
31. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973–1973bb-4 (2006)).
32. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379
(1971); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966).
33. See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971).
34. Id.
35. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973) (citations omitted).
36. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986).
37. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279 (2004).
38. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 113.
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and did not strike down the Indiana plan as a partisan gerrymander.39
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun supported finding
partisan gerrymandering justiciable. However, they declined to use a
standard of only requiring plaintiffs to show a lack of proportionate
representation of political parties.40 Showing that the party that won
forty percent of the vote did not capture forty percent of the seats would
not be enough. Rather, the plurality would require showing that “the
electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their
opportunity to influence the political process effectively,”41 as well as “a
threshold showing of discriminatory vote dilution.”42
Justices Powell and Stevens would have applied a less demanding
standard, directing courts to weigh factors including “shapes of voting
districts,” “adherence to established political subdivision boundaries,”
“the nature of the legislative procedures by which the apportionment law
was adopted,” and “legislative history reflecting contemporaneous
legislative goals.”43 On the other hand, then-Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor would have held partisan
gerrymandering claims to be nonjusticiable political questions.44
After letting the lower courts grapple with the Bandemer result for
nearly two decades, the Court revisited the partisan gerrymandering issue
in 2004 in Vieth v. Jubelirer.45 In Vieth, the Court analyzed another
Republican-created gerrymandering plan, crafted by the Pennsylvania
Legislature, but the Court again failed to reach consensus on how
partisan gerrymandering claims should be handled.46
Justice Scalia, joined by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O’Connor and Thomas, argued that partisan gerrymandering cases were
nonjusticiable due to “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving [them].”47 He argued that eighteen years of lower
courts’ attempts to craft a manageable standard had been fruitless as the
Bandemer plurality’s holding “has almost invariably produced the same

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 173 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
Id.
Id. at 277–78 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
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result (except for the incurring of attorney’s fees) as would have obtained
if the question were nonjusticiable.”48
Justice Kennedy, while concurring in the judgment, broke with the
four-Justice plurality and argued that judicial review could be available
for a partisan gerrymandering claim “if some limited and precise
rationale were found to correct an established violation of the
Constitution in some redistricting cases.”49 He suggested that
technological advancement “may produce new methods of analysis that
make more evident the precise nature of the burdens gerrymanders
impose on the representational rights of voters and parties. That would
facilitate court efforts to identify and remedy the burdens, with judicial
intervention limited by the derived standards.”50
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer all dissented,
presenting various standards they would have applied to gerrymandering
claims. Justice Stevens would have required showing a lack of neutral
criteria to justify a map that appeared to be drawn to maximize partisan
advantage.51 Justices Souter and Ginsburg suggested a five-prong test52
including a showing of intentional “packing”53 or “cracking”54 and a
departure from traditional districting principles, including “contiguity,
compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and conformity with
geographic features.”55 Justice Breyer suggested an analysis of several
factors, including the frequency of redistricting, the departure from
traditional redistricting criteria, the failure of a majority party to capture
a majority of legislative seats, and the absence of mitigating factors, such
as a third party upsetting the two-party status quo.56 While the dissenters
presented different standards to analyze partisan gerrymandering claims,
they agreed that such claims should be justiciable.

48. Id. at 279.
49. Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 313.
51. Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 347–51 (Souter, J., dissenting).
53. “A gerrymandering technique in which a dominant political or racial group minimizes
minority representation by concentrating the minority into as few districts as possible.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1140.
54. “A gerrymandering technique in which a geographically concentrated political or racial
group that is large enough to constitute a district’s dominant force is broken up by district lines and
dispersed throughout two or more districts.” Id. at 395.
55. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 348 (Souter, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 365–67 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Two decades of arguing about partisan gerrymandering claims still
left the Supreme Court deeply divided, with pluralities forcefully arguing
each side of the question. Meanwhile, Justice Kennedy straddled the
middle of the divide.
C. Campaign Finance
The Court has exhibited similar disagreement in its campaign finance
jurisprudence. Buckley v. Valeo, decided in 1976, is the major
precedent.57 At issue in Buckley were significant amendments to the
campaign finance laws that were enacted by Congress following the
1972 election.58 While Buckley’s sprawling per curiam opinion treated
many issues raised by the complex legislation, the major holdings
relevant to later campaign finance controversies established that a
contribution limit imposed on donors did not violate political speech
rights protected by the First Amendment, but that an expenditure limit
imposed on candidates did.59
With the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,60
Congress gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to revisit many issues
raised in Buckley. In McConnell v. FEC, a deeply divided Court used
Buckley to largely uphold the newer, more restrictive campaign finance
legislation against various plaintiffs’ allegations that the legislation
impermissibly burdened their political advocacy in violation of the First
Amendment.61 However, the Court’s long and complex opinion drew
several dissents, from Justices Scalia62 and Thomas,63 who criticized the
precedents that the Buckley Court created,64 and from Justice Kennedy65

57. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
58. See id. at 6.
59. See id. at 58–59.
60. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 2, 18, 28, 36, and 47 U.S.C. (2006)).
61. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
62. Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id. at 266 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. See, e.g., id. at 257–58 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing
the Court’s decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), which
refused to strike down a statute which prevented corporate expenditures on behalf of a state political
candidate as a violation of the First Amendment); id. at 272 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority’s holding as “continu[ing] a disturbing trend:
the steady decrease in the level of scrutiny applied to restrictions on core political speech”).
65. Id. at 286–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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and then-Chief Justice Rehnquist,66 who criticized the way that the
majority applied Buckley.
Nearly thirty years after Buckley, the Court’s campaign finance
precedents rested on the votes of a narrow five-Justice majority,
including Justice O’Connor. Her retirement created the possibility that
the Court could change direction on the constitutionality of campaign
finance regulation under the First Amendment. With two new Justices,
the Roberts Court addressed the issue of campaign finance restrictions in
2006 in Randall v. Sorrell.67
IV. RANDALL V. SORRELL
A. Facts
In 1997, Vermont enacted the campaign finance law at issue in
Randall.68 The statute imposed strict expenditure limitations on
candidates for statewide offices and seats in the state legislature, with
incumbents facing slightly more restrictive limits on campaign spending
than challengers.69 The statute also imposed contribution limits on
individuals, political committees, and political parties.70 While the
expenditure limits were indexed to inflation, the contribution limits were
not.71 In addition, the contribution limits were the lowest of any state.72
B. Initial Judicial Review
Various plaintiffs who had participated in the Vermont electoral
process brought suit in federal district court, arguing that the campaign
finance statute was unconstitutional in light of the First Amendment and
the Supreme Court’s Buckley precedent.73 The district court found that

66. Id. at 351 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part).
67. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
68. See 1997 Vt. Acts & Resolves 63.
69. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2486 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805a(a)–(e) (2002)).
For example, non-incumbent candidates for governor could spend $300,000 per two-year election
cycle, while candidates for state representative in a single-member district could spend $2000 per
cycle. Id. Incumbents seeking reelection could spend $255,000 and $1800, respectively. Id.
70. Id. (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805a). For example, individuals could not give more
than $400 to a gubernatorial campaign or more than $200 to a campaign for a state representative.
Id.
71. Id. at 2486.
72. Id. at 2493.
73. See id. at 2487.
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the expenditure limits violated the First Amendment, but that most of the
contribution limits were constitutional.74 A divided Second Circuit panel
largely disagreed. The circuit court found that all of the contribution
limits were constitutional. It also found that the expenditure limits could
be constitutional if narrowly tailored to the state’s compelling interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance thereof, and to its compelling
interest in limiting the time incumbents spend fundraising.75 All parties
petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted in 2005.76
C. Supreme Court Review
A divided Supreme Court overturned both the expenditure limits and
the contribution limits.77 Justice Breyer wrote the plurality opinion for
the Court, but only Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined his
opinion.78 Justice Kennedy filed a separate concurrence, as did Justice
Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joined.79 Justices Stevens and Souter
(joined by Justice Ginsburg) each wrote dissents.80
Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion held that the Court’s precedent in
Buckley necessarily controlled the outcome of the case with respect to
the expenditure limitations and declined to reconsider Buckley’s holding
that such limitations were unconstitutional.81 With respect to the
contribution limits, Justice Breyer noted that Buckley did hold that limits
“closely drawn” to a “sufficiently important interest,” such as preventing
corruption and the appearance thereof, were constitutional.82 However,
he noted that the decision implied that at a certain point the limits
become so strict that they run afoul of the First Amendment because they
“magnify the advantages of incumbency to the point where they place
challengers at a significant disadvantage.”83 Justice Breyer thus found
that at some point, low contribution limits hurt electoral competitiveness
too much, and that Vermont’s limits seemed to fall below that point. He
74. Id.; The district court’s opinion is reported as Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D.
Vt. 2000).
75. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2487; Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004).
76. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2487.
77. Id. at 2500.
78. Justice Alito did not join Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2 of the opinion, dealing with whether
Buckley should be reconsidered. Id. at 2500 (Alito, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 2485 (plurality opinion).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2491.
82. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
83. Id. at 2492.
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argued that “contribution limits that are too low can also harm the
electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective
campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic
accountability.”84 Justice Breyer’s opinion thus signaled that electoral
competitiveness is an important constitutional consideration.
Justice Breyer analyzed five factors with respect to the campaign
finance law’s contribution limits: first, the suggestion in the trial record
that the limits “will significantly restrict the amount of funding available
for challengers to run competitive campaigns”;85 second, the law’s effect
on political parties, which held them to the same limits as individuals;86
third, the law’s limits on volunteer services on behalf of a candidate;87
fourth, the law’s failure to adjust the limits for inflation;88 and fifth, the
lack of special justification for the extremely restrictive nature of the
limits.89 Justice Breyer argued that these five factors suggested that the
contribution limits were “not narrowly tailored” and “disproportionately
burden[ed] numerous First Amendment interests.”90 The First
Amendment’s interest in protecting political speech and association
rights thus overcame any state interest in regulating campaign finance.
Because Justice Breyer used the law’s effect on electoral competitiveness
as a factor in his analysis (particularly with respect to the first factor he
listed), the plurality implicitly held that electoral competitiveness is an
important interest protected by the First Amendment.
Justice Alito largely concurred with Justice Breyer, but as he thought
the case did not directly present an opportunity to analyze whether
Buckley should be overruled, he did not join the opinion as it pertained to
whether revisiting Buckley in an appropriate case might be proper.91
Justice Kennedy, who had already opposed the Court’s application of
Buckley,92 concurred that the contribution limits were unconstitutional
by using the same reasoning he had already used to oppose a broad
reading of Buckley, noting that important First Amendment speech and
association rights were at stake.93 He also noted that the Court’s
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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Id.
Id. at 2495.
Id. at 2496–97.
Id. at 2498.
Id. at 2499.
Id.
Id. at 2499–500.
Id. at 2500–01 (Alito, J., concurring).
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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approach created difficulties, “requir[ing] us to explain why $200 is too
restrictive a limit while $1,500 is not.”94
Justices Thomas and Scalia also concurred in the result but disagreed
with Justice Breyer’s Buckley–based rationale. They reiterated their
opposition to the Buckley regime of limiting campaign contributions.95
They “continue[d] to believe that Buckley provides insufficient
protection to political speech, the core of the First Amendment.”96
Rather than concerns about electoral competitiveness, they were
motivated by a reading of the First Amendment as protecting political
speech from regulation regardless of its effects.
Justice Stevens also disagreed with Buckley, but he dissented from
the judgment.97 Rather than disagreeing with Buckley’s holding on
contribution limits, he would have overruled Buckley’s holding that
expenditure limits are unconstitutional.98 He argued that candidates
could disseminate messages in ways that do not involve spending money,
and that “a candidate need not flood the airways with ceaseless soundbites of trivial information in order to provide voters with reasons to
support her.”99 Justice Stevens noted the free publicity that accompanied
high-profile debates between presidential candidates in the elections of
1860, 1900, and 1960.100 He also argued that expenditure limits are good
policy because they reduce the time that candidates and their staffs spend
fundraising.101 Like Justice Stevens, Justices Souter and Ginsburg also
expressed doubt as to Buckley’s precedent on expenditure limits and
thought that the contribution limits were not too low to survive judicial
scrutiny under Buckley.102
Figure 1 illustrates how the Justices voted in Randall, and whether
they justified their votes with a concern for electoral competitiveness.

Rationale
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2501–02 (Thomas, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 2502.
97. Id. at 2506 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2508–09.
100. See id. at 2509.
101. Id. It is worth noting that candidates could spend less time fundraising if they were not
required to raise funds from donors facing contribution limits. In a sense, therefore, the government
creates the problem of increased time spent fundraising that it is attempting to solve by imposing
expenditure limits.
102. Id. at 2511 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Vote

Randall

Should not interfere
with competitiveness

Uphold the campaign
finance scheme
Strike down the
campaign finance
scheme

Chief Justice Roberts
Justice Breyer
Justice Alito

Interference with
competitiveness
allowed and/or
irrelevant
Justice Stevens
Justice Souter
Justice Ginsburg
Justice Kennedy
Justice Scalia
Justice Thomas

Figure 1: Randall Justice distribution.
While Buckley had purported to set forth the constitutional status of
contribution and expenditure limits, support for its continuing influence
was weak on the Randall Court. Of the nine Justices, three (Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) expressly opposed strict contribution and
expenditure limits, and three (Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg)
expressly supported them.103 The remaining three Justices (Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Breyer and Alito) applied Buckley to strike down
Vermont’s expenditure limits as completely barred and its contribution
limits as too low in light of their effects.104 A major justification for the
plurality’s decision to strike down Vermont’s contribution limits as too
strict was a concern for electoral competitiveness. However, concern for
electoral competitiveness was less evident in the plurality decision in the
Supreme Court’s next election law opinion, LULAC v. Perry,105 handed
down two days after Randall.
V. LULAC V. PERRY
A. Facts
LULAC involved the 2003 redistricting plan that Texas Republicans
drew to replace a court-imposed plan that had been used for the 2002
elections.106 While the 2003 plan was indisputably gerrymandered to
favor Republicans, the 2002 judge-drawn plan had largely left intact the
1991 gerrymander created by Democrats to favor Democratic

103.
104.
105.
106.

182

See fig.1.
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LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2606 (2006).
Id.
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candidates.107 In the 2000 elections, carried out under the 1991 plan,
Democrats won seventeen of thirty House seats.108 In the 2002 elections,
under the court-drawn plan, the Democrats won seventeen of thirty-two
seats.109 The 2004 elections, under the new Republican gerrymander, left
Democrats with eleven of the thirty-two seats.110 Meanwhile, voter
preferences shifted toward the Republican Party as the Republican share
of the statewide vote rose from 47 percent in 1990 to 58 percent of the
vote in statewide races in 2004.111
The various gerrymanders did not lead to electoral competitiveness.
In 1992, only two candidates for Texas House seats won with less than
55 percent of the vote.112 In 2002, only four candidates won with less
than 55 percent of the vote.113 In 2004, only two successful candidates
captured less than 55 percent of the vote.114 This same result occurred in
2006, despite some changes to the plan required by the Supreme Court’s
ruling.115
B. Initial Judicial Review
After the 2003 plan was enacted, various plaintiffs filed suit
“alleging a host of constitutional and statutory violations,” including
partisan gerrymandering claims and allegations that the redistricting plan
violated the Voting Rights Act.116 The district court initially held that the
plan was legal, but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded that
decision in 2004 in light of its just-issued Vieth decision.117 On remand,
the district court judge would have struck down the plan on the theory
that mid-decade redistricting violates the one-person, one-vote standard,
107. Id. at 2605–06.
108. Id. at 2606.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2605–06.
112. Office of the Secretary of State, Race Summary Report (Nov. 3, 1992),
http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (select “1992 General Election” and click “Submit”).
113. Office of the Secretary of State, Race Summary Report (Nov. 5, 2002),
http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (select “2002 General Election” and click “Submit”).
114. Office of the Secretary of State, Race Summary Report (Nov. 2, 2004),
http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (select “2004 General Election” and click “Submit”).
115. See CNN.COM, State Races: Texas, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006//
pages/results/states/TX/index.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). A LULAC plurality did strike down
one district on statutory grounds as violating the Voting Rights Act; this required slight changes to
the Texas map, despite the fact that the rest of the map survived the constitutional challenges.
116. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2607.
117. Id. Vieth is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 45–56.
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but refrained from doing so because he believed that that argument was
outside the scope of the Supreme Court’s remand.118 The Supreme Court
again granted review of the district court’s decision, analyzing the 2003
plan in light of constitutional equal protection requirements and statutory
requirements under the Voting Rights Act. For purposes of this
Comment, only the constitutional claims are considered.
C. Supreme Court Review
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court, largely upholding
the 2003 plan.119 He stated that a majority of the Court still believed, as
it had in Vieth, that partisan gerrymandering claims could be
justiciable.120 He then proceeded to analyze whether the plaintiffs
presented a manageable standard for judicial analysis of partisan
gerrymandering claims that the Court could apply.121 Justice Kennedy
declined to adopt the plaintiffs’ theory that mid-decade redistricting
should be considered presumptively unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause and First Amendment.122 He also rejected their theory
that mid-decade redistricting violated the one person, one vote standard,
noting that the plurality “disagree[d] with appellants’ view that a
legislature’s decision to override a valid, court-drawn plan mid-decade is
sufficiently suspect to give shape to a reliable standard for identifying
unconstitutional political gerrymanders.”123 Thus, Justice Kennedy still
favored treating partisan gerrymandering claims as justiciable, but again
gave no standard for the courts to analyze such claims. His vote, along
with the votes of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito (discussed below), enabled the plan to withstand the partisan
gerrymandering challenge, over dissent from the other four Justices.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, would have held middecade redistricting plans created for partisan reasons unconstitutional as
political gerrymanders.124 Analyzing the Texas plan, Justice Stevens
highlighted electoral competitiveness concerns by arguing that

118. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2607.
119. Id. at 2605. Justice Kennedy did join the four dissenting Justices to strike down one
district as violating the Voting Rights Act; this facet of the decision is outside the scope of this
Comment. See id.
120. Id. at 2607.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2609.
123. Id. at 2611–12.
124. Id. at 2626, 2634 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Republican legislators from safe seats would be less likely to represent
the needs of Democratic constituents.125 He also noted that “[s]afe seats
may harm the democratic process in other ways,” including diminishing
voter interest, reducing turnout, and polarizing legislatures.126
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, voted to dismiss the
partisan gerrymandering challenge in light of the Court’s continued
inability to agree on a standard for impermissible gerrymanders, and thus
considered that issue “the subject of an improvident grant of
certiorari.”127 However, he reiterated his desire to find a standard that the
Court could agree on and noted that he disagreed with Justice Kennedy’s
“seemingly flat rejection of any test of gerrymander turning on the
process followed in redistricting.”128 Justice Breyer also wrote separately
to discuss his opposition to the Texas gerrymander as it, in his view,
violated the Equal Protection Clause by “overwhelmingly rel[ying] upon
the unjustified use of purely partisan line-drawing considerations.”129
On the other hand, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito,
reserved judgment on whether partisan gerrymandering claims are
justiciable.130 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, reiterated his
opposition to treating gerrymandering claims as justiciable.131 He
criticized Justice Kennedy’s opinion for “conclud[ing] that the appellants
have failed to state a claim as to political gerrymandering, without ever
articulating what the elements of such a claim consist of. . . . [W]e again
dispose of this claim in a way that . . . perpetuates a cause of action with
no discernable content.”132
Figure 2 illustrates how the Justices voted in LULAC, and whether
they justified their votes with a concern for electoral competitiveness.

Rationale
LULAC

Vote

Uphold the
gerrymander
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Should not
interfere with
competitiveness

Interference with
competitiveness allowed
and/or not mentioned
Chief Justice Roberts
Justice Scalia

Id. at 2639.
Id. at 2640 n.10 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2647 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 2652 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
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Strike down the
gerrymander

Justice Stevens

[2007

Justice Kennedy
Justice Souter*
Justice Thomas
Justice Ginsburg*
Justice Alito
Justice Breyer

*Only voted to dismiss constitutional challenge because the Justices could not
agree on a standard (see supra note 127 and accompanying text).

Figure 2: LULAC Justice distribution.
Thus, five Justices (Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer)
agreed that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable, but did not
agree on a standard for courts to apply to such claims.133 Justice
Kennedy voted to uphold the plan, while the other four would have
preferred to strike it down as overly partisan under their preferred
standards.134 Justice Stevens highlighted concerns with the plan’s effect
on electoral competitiveness, but no other Justice directly addressed the
issue.135 Two Justices (Scalia and Thomas) treated partisan
gerrymandering claims as nonjusticiable, while the Court’s newest two
Justices (Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito) reserved judgment on
the issue.136
VI. ANALYSIS
In one Term, the Supreme Court held that campaign finance laws
cannot overly impinge on electoral competitiveness, but refrained from
making a similar holding with respect to electoral districting. The
Randall plurality held that overrestrictive campaign finance regulations
harm electoral competitiveness, and that too much harm to electoral
competitiveness violates First Amendment rights in the context of
campaign finance restrictions.137 However, most of the Justices who
voted to strike down the campaign finance regulations at issue in Randall
voted to uphold the Texas Legislature’s anticompetitive gerrymander in
LULAC.138 These Justices implicitly held that competitiveness is not a
133. See fig. 2.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See supra notes 81–90 and accompanying text.
138. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito voted with the
plurality in both cases.
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fundamental consideration when analyzing redistricting, either under the
First Amendment or under the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, insofar as
the same constitutional values should govern all areas of election law, the
Justices’ rationales and positions do not seem to be entirely consistent.
Electoral competitiveness seems to matter greatly in one context, but not
in another. This Part gives a rough analysis of each Justice’s position
with respect to this conflict and looks at possible ways to harmonize the
Court’s jurisprudence to make it more coherent.
Figure 3 illustrates whether the Justices justify their votes with a
concern for electoral competitiveness in campaign finance regulation and
electoral districting cases, while Figure 4 shows how the Justices have
actually voted in such cases.

Electoral Districting

Campaign Finance Regulation

Explicitly favors
electoral
competitiveness as
constitutionally relevant
Interference with
electoral
competitiveness ignored
(LULAC plurality)

Explicitly favors electoral
competitiveness as
constitutionally relevant
(Randall plurality)
QUADRANT 1

QUADRANT 4
Chief Justice Roberts
Justice Breyer
Justice Alito

Interference with
electoral competitiveness
ignored
QUADRANT 3
Justice Stevens

QUADRANT 2
Justice Scalia
Justice Kennedy
Justice Souter
Justice Thomas
Justice Ginsburg

Figure 3: Rationales

Electoral Districting

Campaign Finance Regulation

Votes for electoral
competitiveness outcome
Votes against electoral

Votes for electoral
competitiveness outcome
(Randall plurality)
Justice Breyer

Votes against electoral
competitiveness
outcome
Justice Stevens
Justice Souter
Justice Ginsburg

Chief Justice Roberts
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Justice Scalia
Justice Kennedy*
Justice Thomas*
Justice Scalia*

*Declined to join holding that electoral competitiveness is important.

Figure 4: Actual votes
A. The Justices’ Positions
1. Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer’s position is perhaps the most internally coherent. In
LULAC, he voted to treat partisan gerrymanders as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause,139 and his opinion in Randall demonstrates
concern about the effects of restrictive campaign finance regulations on
electoral competitiveness.140 His positions on both issues can be
reconciled with a desire to treat electoral competitiveness as an important
value protected by the Constitution.
2. Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy’s position is similar to Justice Breyer’s. He
expressed “skepticism” at how much campaign finance restriction the
Court allows141 and concern about the effects of gerrymandering on the
political process.142 However, unlike Justice Breyer, Justice Kennedy
seems to oppose campaign finance restrictions on First Amendment
grounds without regard to electoral competitiveness. Justice Kennedy
also departs with Justice Breyer in that he has not actually voted to strike
down a state electoral districting plan. Instead, he expressed concern over
finding an appropriate role for the courts in settling partisan
gerrymandering disputes. Rather than “commit federal and state courts to
unprecedented intervention in the American political process,” he would
apply “some limited and precise rationale . . . to correct an established
violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases.”143 However, he
has not yet approved of any such standard.144 Justice Kennedy, while
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
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LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2652 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2496 (2006).
Id. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 316–17 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 306.
See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2611.
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appearing to value electoral competitiveness, treats other values such as
judicial caution as more important than competitiveness.
3. Justice Stevens
Although he most directly addressed the anticompetitive effects of
the Texas gerrymander in LULAC,145 Justice Stevens showed little
concern for the anticompetitive effects of the law at issue in Randall. His
Randall opinion’s only discussion of electoral competitiveness was to
note that available evidence did not conclusively prove that all
expenditure limits were designed to or actually did protect incumbents
from challengers.146 Problematically, his argument that “a legislative
judgment” on campaign finance “should command the greatest possible
deference from judges”147 fails to explain how courts should preserve
electoral competitiveness if legislators craft campaign finance laws that
encumber their opponents’ ability to mount effective challenges.
Rather than letting candidates spend time and money crafting issue
advertising to appeal to an inattentive public, Justice Stevens would have
candidates rely more on free publicity, such as media and debates.148
However, his examples of publicity attending high-profile presidential
debates are likely unpersuasive to a congressional candidate challenging
an entrenched incumbent. The media is less interested in races without
interesting storylines, and many voters are generally inattentive to
politics. While presidential candidates can generate much free publicity,
candidates for less prominent offices simply cannot rely on a generous
media to disseminate their messages. Candidates at all levels use paid
advertising—television and radio commercials, mail, and even telephone
calls.149 All of these methods cost money—money that Justice Stevens’
approach could leave unavailable. Because a significant amount of
campaign spending is necessary to run a competitive campaign in most
circumstances, Justice Stevens’ jurisprudence would offer little
protection to electoral competitiveness in a spending context, regardless
of his stated desire to overturn all anticompetitive partisan gerrymanders.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See id. at 2640 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2510 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2508–09.
See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
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4. Justices Souter and Ginsburg
Justices Souter and Ginsburg both take an approach similar to Justice
Stevens, though they do not attack the anticompetitive nature of
gerrymandering as strongly as Justice Stevens did in LULAC. Both
Justices’ opinions are hostile to gerrymandering, but supportive of
regulation of candidates’ campaign financing in both competitive and
noncompetitive races.150
5. Justices Scalia and Thomas
While Justices Scalia and Thomas have repeatedly reiterated their
opposition to limiting what candidates for office can say and spend,151
they promote less of a judicial role in regulating the districts in which the
candidates run for office. Neither would allow a cause of action for
partisan gerrymandering, allowing the most anticompetitive districting
plans to stand.152 Thus, their approach is inconsistent with the Randall
plurality’s attention to electoral competitiveness in evaluating campaign
finance regulations. They note this disagreement in their concurrence:
“[t]he illegitimacy of Buckley is further underscored by the continuing
inability of the Court (and the plurality here) to apply Buckley in a
coherent and principled fashion.”153 These Justices would prefer to strike
down campaign finance regulations under the First Amendment without
regard to electoral competitiveness, and they view the courts as unable to
address the effects of gerrymandering on electoral competitiveness.
6. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
While Chief Justice Roberts did not directly express doubt about
Buckley’s continued viability in the same way that Justice Alito did,154
both Justices’ positions are similar. Though both Justices seem to be
weak supporters of Buckley, neither was moved by the anticompetitive
nature of the partisan gerrymander that they declined to strike down in
LULAC. They did, however, reserve judgment on whether any partisan
gerrymandering standard could be crafted in a future case that presented

150. See, e.g., LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2647 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2511 (Souter, J., dissenting).
151. See, e.g., Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2502 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152. See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2502 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2500–01 (Alito, J., concurring in part).
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the issue more directly to the Court.155 These two Justices’ positions
seem the most inconsistent—they joined Justice Breyer in saying the
competitiveness is important, but voted against him to uphold an
anticompetitive gerrymander. The Court’s newest Justices will be forced
to face the tension between the rationales for their votes in Randall and
LULAC as they continue to craft their Supreme Court jurisprudence.
B. Potential Solutions
Though the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding election law is
somewhat internally inconsistent, it could attain a more coherent
jurisprudence. The Constitution does not explicitly mandate that
legislative elections be as competitive as possible, though the Framers
certainly seemed to expect that frequent elections would keep the
government dependent on the people, not lead to entrenched incumbency
in the House of Representatives.156 The Court therefore can craft a
coherent jurisprudence without demanding that the courts enforce
electoral competitiveness as a constitutional value. However, the Court
faces a more difficult task in attempting to create a persuasive
jurisprudence in which electoral competitiveness is treated as an essential
value under the First Amendment in one context but irrelevant in
another. The Justices’ positions in Randall and LULAC suggest four
possible broad approaches to this dilemma, two of which are internally
consistent, while two are inconsistent. This section first analyzes the
consistent solutions, followed by the inconsistent ones.
1. Consistent solutions
a. Electoral competitiveness as a constitutional value (quadrant
1).157 One solution to the current inconsistency would be for the Court to
explicitly embrace electoral competitiveness as a value implied by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Randall plurality held that the
potential for noncompetitive elections showed that the campaign finance
law at issue infringed on the First Amendment’s protection of democratic
discourse too much.158 Meanwhile, the LULAC Justices who dissented as
to the partisan gerrymander claim noted the First Amendment value of

155.
156.
157.
158.

LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2652 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
See fig.3.
See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2485, 2495.
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political association and the Fourteenth Amendment value of equal
protection to justify their desire to strike down partisan gerrymanders.159
If Justice Kennedy finds a standard that he supports by which courts
can evaluate excessively partisan gerrymanders, and begins voting to
strike down such plans, this approach—valuing electoral competitiveness
as a constitutional value—would likely result. In any event, Justice
Kennedy seems close to this approach now, as does Justice Breyer. Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, who reserved judgment on whether a
standard to judicially manage partisan gerrymandering claims could
exist, could also pursue this approach if they decide that such standards
exist when evaluating a case that squarely presents the issue. If they
move in this direction, the Court could conceivably have a bloc of up to
seven Justices—every Justice except Justices Scalia and Thomas—
voting to impose some type of standard whereby courts could invalidate
excessive gerrymandering. Meanwhile, a plurality (Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Breyer and Alito) would skeptically evaluate campaign
finance regulations in light of their effect on electoral competitiveness,
and join with the Justices who oppose all campaign finance regulation to
strike down schemes that unduly limit the ability of challengers to mount
a competitive campaign. This approach would lead to judicial protection
of electoral competitiveness in multiple contexts in election law.
A major criticism of this approach is that it would invite much
judicial involvement in the political thicket of election law. Further, any
standard that could seriously curtail the amount of gerrymandering in
American politics would likely invite immediate litigation in many
states, and could lead to significant litigation after every decennial
redistricting. State (and federal) legislators would likely resent that
degree of intrusion by courts into their election law legislation. Justice
Kennedy’s reluctance to pick a standard seems significantly motivated
by this concern.160 Nevertheless, selecting a clear standard could put
states on notice such that they could craft acceptable plans in the first
instance. Baker and its one person, one vote progeny led to considerable
litigation as states were forced to reapportion election districts to comply
159. See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2634–35 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Also see Justice Kennedy’s Vieth concurrence: “If a court were to find that a State did impose
burdens and restrictions on groups or persons by reason of their views, there would likely be a First
Amendment violation, unless the State shows some compelling interest.” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 315 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
160. See Persily et al., supra note 30, at 1314 (“Standards of equally sized districts are much
easier to administer than would be similar ones that might be needed to regulate partisan
gerrymandering.”).
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with the equal population standard, but states now routinely ensure that
their districting can withstand equal-population scrutiny.161 Similarly, if
the Supreme Court hands down a clear standard that articulates how
much gerrymandering is too much, states can ensure that they are on the
proper side of the line as they redistrict. Just as Baker, though
controversial at first, is now an accepted principle of constitutional law,
an anti-gerrymandering principle, if relatively simple to apply, could
become a settled, relatively non-controversial principle in a few years.
While it would be difficult for the Court to articulate a clear standard
of required electoral competitiveness in redistricting, it would likely be
even harder for the Court to articulate a standard for measuring campaign
finance regulations in light of electoral competitiveness. The linedrawing problem highlighted by Justice Kennedy is significant,162 and
courts could expect much litigation at the margins as states try to probe
how restrictive they could be without curtailing competitiveness too
much. While this criticism is significant, however, it is worth noting that
involving the courts to a high degree is inevitable as long as the Court
attempts to chart a course between complete deference to legislatures and
complete prohibition of legislative regulation of campaign financing.
b. Electoral competitiveness as a value unprotected by the
Constitution (quadrant 2).163 Another alternative would be to retreat
from the above position and hold that electoral competitiveness is a
nonjusticiable political question that the Constitution does not command
the courts to address. Justices Scalia and Thomas already take this
position, justifying their opposition to campaign finance regulations on
other grounds.164 That campaign finance regulations can stifle electoral
competition is irrelevant to the fact that, in these Justices’ views, the
regulations violate the First Amendment’s protection of political
speech.165 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito may also be
sympathetic to this view; future campaign finance cases will show
whether they continue to forge compromise plurality opinions with
Justice Breyer or whether they move closer to Justices Scalia and
161. See id. at 1301; see also Reapportionment and Redistricting: An Introduction, in GUIDE
U.S. ELECTIONS (John L. Moore, Jon P. Preimesberger & David R. Tarr eds., vol. 2, 2001),
available at http://library.cqpress.com/elections/gusel2-153-7238-393327 (last visited Jan. 15,
2007).
162. See supra text accompanying note 94.
163. See fig.3.
164. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
165. Id.
TO
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Thomas on this issue. If they take the latter course, the Court will likely
have a bloc of five Justices who are skeptical of campaign finance
regulations on First Amendment grounds, but who do not use an electoral
competitiveness rationale to strike them down.
This approach would leave Randall as an outlier in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence. Campaign finance schemes would still be
analyzed by the courts, but electoral competitiveness would not be
considered in evaluating election laws.
Insofar as Justice Kennedy continues to vote to uphold
gerrymandering plans, the Court would ignore electoral competitiveness
in that realm as well. If Justice Kennedy ever voted for a standard by
which to measure partisan gerrymanders, greater electoral
competitiveness could result, but the rationale for the standard could be
based on some other principle of constitutional law, such as a First
Amendment right to be free from political classifications that curtail
representational rights.166
A potential criticism of this approach is that it could lead to
increased judicial involvement in campaign finance if Justices Scalia and
Thomas carry the day and are able to strike down more campaign finance
schemes as incompatible with the First Amendment. On the other hand,
their standards are likely easier for lower courts to apply than Justice
Breyer’s case-by-case multi-factor evaluation of a law’s effects,
implying that if Justices Scalia and Thomas carry the day, less litigation
may result once existing campaign finance schemes are brought in
harmony with their views of the First Amendment. However, the harms
caused by gerrymandering would still exist absent Justice Kennedy
finding a standard he supports, unless political processes curtail
gerrymandering some other way.
2. Inconsistent solutions
a. Electoral competitiveness as relevant to districting but not
campaign finance (quadrant 3).167 A third alternative would be
essentially the opposite of the current disparity established by Randall
and LULAC. This approach would be to hold that partisan gerrymanders
are unjustified because of their anticompetitive effects, but
anticompetitive effects of campaign finance regulations will largely be
upheld, notwithstanding the First Amendment. This view, which requires
166. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 315 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
167. See fig.3.
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one to compartmentalize a constitutional right and the freedom to spend
money exercising that right, seems difficult to defend.168 Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg are closest to this approach, but do not
clearly articulate what they would do if a campaign finance regulation
were shown to inhibit electoral competitiveness.
While fairly high contribution and/or expenditure limits may not
directly influence electoral competitiveness in obvious ways, low limits
at some point will benefit incumbents at the expense of challengers. If a
legislature were to completely ban campaign expenditures, incumbents
would have a significant electoral advantage because of greater name
recognition and the ability to use the resources of their offices to reach
out to constituents.169 Challengers, meanwhile, would find it almost
impossible to educate the electorate about their campaigns. Thus, an
expenditure limit of $0 per campaign or a contribution limit of $0 per
donor would inhibit electoral competitiveness.
While it may not be clear that Vermont’s lowest-in-the-nation
contribution limits and associated expenditure limits inhibited electoral
competitiveness to that degree, the Randall dissenters’ approach gives
little confidence that the judiciary would restrain self-dealing legislators
who attempted to implement an anticompetitive campaign finance
scheme. This suggests that, insofar as the Randall dissenters rely on a
principle of electoral competitiveness to attack partisan gerrymandering,
their approach is inconsistent with their laissez-faire treatment of
campaign finance. This approach, despite being hostile to
anticompetitive gerrymandering, does not offer robust protection to the
value of electoral competitiveness more generally.
b. The current confusion (quadrant 4).170 In any event, the Court has
yet to agree on any of the above positions and has an inconsistent
electoral competitiveness jurisprudence. Insofar as Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito rely on anticompetitive effects of campaign finance
regulations to strike them down, their jurisprudence is inconsistent with

168. See Eugene Volokh, Money and Speech, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, June 28, 2006,
http://www.opinionjournal.com/federation/feature/?id=110008575 (“Just consider some analogies.
Would we say ‘money is abortion’? I doubt it, but a law that banned the spending of money would
surely be a serious restriction on abortion rights (whether or not you think that the [C]ourt was right
to recognize such rights). A law that capped the spending of money for abortions at a small amount,
far smaller than abortions often cost, would likewise be a burden on abortion rights, and dismissing
this argument as ‘it is quite wrong to equate money and abortion’ would be unsound.”).
169. See supra note 6 regarding incumbent advantage.
170. See fig.3.
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their decision ignoring the anticompetitive effects of the partisan
gerrymander they upheld. Insofar as Justice Stevens relies on
anticompetitiveness in gerrymandering to strike it down, his position is
consistent with the Randall plurality’s use of electoral competitiveness as
an important First Amendment value, but is inconsistent with his Randall
opinion. Insofar as Justice Kennedy dislikes the anticompetitiveness of
campaign finance regulations but cannot decide on a standard by which
to measure the numerous partisan gerrymanders throughout the country,
his approach is inconsistent with the Randall plurality. The Court should
clarify its jurisprudence and make it more internally consistent, by
moving toward one of the consistent solutions outlined above.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s two most recent election law decisions are
fundamentally at odds with one another. In the context of campaign
finance, lower courts are instructed to treat electoral competitiveness as
an essential First Amendment value, while in the context of
gerrymandering, they are told that competitiveness is largely irrelevant.
The tension between these two decisions suggests that the Supreme
Court’s current position on election law is unstable. The Court should
revisit its holdings on electoral competitiveness and develop a coherent
jurisprudence that treats the value of competitiveness consistently.
Peter J. Jenkins
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